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Abstract—To address the increasing security demands of indus-
trial deployments, OPC UA is one of the first industrial protocols
explicitly designed with security in mind. However, deploying it
securely requires a thorough configuration of a wide range of
options. Thus, assessing the security of OPC UA deployments and
their configuration is necessary to ensure secure operation, most
importantly confidentiality and integrity of industrial processes.
In this work, we present extensions to the popular Metasploit
Framework to ease network-based security assessments of OPC
UA deployments. To this end, we discuss methods to discover
OPC UA servers, test their authentication, obtain their configu-
ration, and check for vulnerabilities. Ultimately, our work enables
operators to verify the (security) configuration of their systems
and identify potential attack vectors.
I. INTRODUCTION
Traditionally, industrial protocols, such as Modbus and
Profinet, were designed to operate in isolated networks and
thus provide little to no security functionality. However, the
increasing interconnection of industrial processes [1] as well
as serious security threats, e.g., evidenced by the cyberattack
on a German steel mill or NotPetya [2], demand for secure
industrial protocols. One prime candidate to fill this demand
is OPC Unified Architecture (OPC UA) [3], a comparatively
new protocol enabling standardized and secure communication
across all levels from the field up to the cloud.
OPC UA has been explicitly designed with security in
mind as attested by a security analysis performed on behalf
of the German Federal Office for Information Security [4].
Still, OPC UA is not secure by default, requiring a thorough
configuration [5]. OPC UA’s inherent complexity and a wide
range of deployment models make this setup a laborious
and error-prone task. In fact, several setup instructions for
OPC UA servers can result in insecure deployments [4], [6].
Consequently, a need for assessing the security of OPC UA
deployments exists, e.g., when integrating them into industrial
environments. This is especially crucial for deployments which
are (un-)intentionally connected to the Internet, where several
thousand probes are searching for exploitable deployments [7].
To aid in performing network-based security assessments of
OPC UA deployments, we present approaches to (i) discover
OPC UA servers in a network, (ii) test for anonymous, default,
or weak login credentials, (iii) retrieve information on the
server and security configuration as well as access rights, and
(iv) test for susceptibility to certain known CVEs and other
potential vulnerabilities. We integrate our tools into the widely
used Metasploit Framework and release the source code1.
1Available as open source at https://github.com/COMSYS/msf-opcua
II. OPC UA SECURITY
OPC UA servers represent objects and their relationships as
a set of nodes in an address space. To realize security, OPC UA
provides authentication, authorization, as well as integrity and
confidentiality protection [8]. For client authentication, OPC
UA allows anonymous access, a combination of username and
password, a certificate, or an authentication token. Further-
more, OPC UA servers can enforce access control for each
node. Correct configuration of authentication is indispensable,
e.g., restricting anonymous access to non-critical servers [5].
Besides, default credentials of manufacturers must be changed.
To secure communication, OPC UA provides different mes-
sage security modes (no security, integrity only, or integrity
and confidentiality) as well as security policies predefining
cryptographic algorithms for encryption and signatures [8].
Depending on the message security mode, the client selects
a security policy during the handshake to protect exchanged
messages. Notably, out of the seven available security policies,
one provides no security, and two have been deprecated
because of now insecure underlying cryptographic primitives.
Overall, while OPC UA provides strong security fea-
tures [4], correct configuration of these security mechanisms
is essential. Otherwise, attackers might be able to access
confidential data or compromise the OPC UA server.
III. ASSESSING SECURITY OF INDUSTRIAL DEPLOYMENTS
The need to provide support for assessing the security of
industrial deployments is emphasized by efforts for other
industrial protocols. Most prominently, different respective
modules for the Metasploit Framework are available [9], rang-
ing from modules for specific PLCs, e.g., Schneider Modicon
or Siemens S7, over SCADA software, e.g., Sielco Sistemi
Winlog or Measuresoft ScadaPro, to industrial protocols, e.g.,
Modbus, Profinet, or IEC 60870-5-104. Furthermore, Masood
et al. [10] recreated Stuxnet’s attack vectors in Metasploit.
Consequently, Metasploit is widely used for security assess-
ments in industrial settings, e.g., in the production line of a
pharmaceutical company [11], to evaluate perimeter security
effectiveness in supervisory and process control zones [12],
or to test industrial firewalls of a natural gas compressor [13].
Likewise, NIST used Metasploit to assess the performance of
industrial systems with security measures in place [14].
IV. OPC UA SECURITY ASSESSMENT
While OPC UA promises a high security level, actually
achieving a secure OPC UA deployment depends on correct
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manual configuration (cf. Section II). Ensuring this for (own)
OPC UA deployments requires network-based security assess-
ments. We use and extend the popular Metasploit Framework
to aid in performing such tasks. As illustrated in Figure 1,
such an assessment requires several sequential steps.
A. Discovery of OPC UA Servers
As the first step of a network-based security assessment,
we need to discover OPC UA servers in a local network. By
default, OPC UA uses TCP port 4840 for its binary protocol
as well as TCP ports 80 (HTTP) and 443 (HTTPS) when
acting as SOAP web service. We extended the network scan
functionality of Metasploit by an OPC UA handshake to verify
that the discovered devices run OPC UA on said ports, thus
obtaining a list of servers for subsequent assessment steps.
B. Testing OPC UA Authentication & Login Credentials
Once an OPC UA server has been discovered, the next
step is to test whether authentication is configured securely.
OPC UA allows for different modes of authentication (cf.
Section II). Out of these modes, especially anonymous access
and the widely-used username/password authentication are
prone to configuration errors. First, anonymous access (empty
login credentials) might give away sensitive information on
the server’s configuration (see below) and imposes the risk of
misconfigured access rights, leading to information leakage
or even the risk of unauthorized write operations. Second,
username/password-based logins come with the risk of default
(documented in manuals) or weak (easily guessable) login
credentials. To test for such problems, we added functionality
to Metasploit to use the built-in login_scanner for OPC
UA deployments. Furthermore, we created a list of OPC UA
specific default credentials from openly accessible setup in-
structions and manuals. Following a similar route, we provide
functionality to check whether the server accepts a self-signed
client certificate without further validation.
C. Deriving OPC UA Server Information & Configuration
If login to an OPC UA server is possible (either anony-
mous, using username/password, or certificate-based), we can
connect to said server to obtain security-related informa-
tion using our extension of Metasploit. First, information
on available and known OPC UA servers can be used to
broaden the scope of the assessment (cf. Figure 1). Second,
information such as ApplicationUri and ProductUri
provide information on the used software and its version,
easing the verification of patch policies and the check for
potential vulnerabilities. Third, different security-related con-
figurations can be assessed, e.g., the use of an appropri-
ate SecurityLevel, MessageSecurityMode enforcing
encryption, security policy specified by the PolicyUri, and
TokenType for authentication (cf. Section II). Finally, iter-
ating through the server namespace of readable and writable
nodes allows to identify misconfigured permissions (especially
for anonymous authentication). Combined, the information
queryable after (anonymous) login to an OPC UA server al-
lows to assess security of the underlying server configuration.
…
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Fig. 1. Our approach for a network-based security assessment of OPC UA
deployments (A) discovers OPC UA servers, (B) tests authentication, (C)
derives server configuration, and (D) checks for vulnerabilities.
D. Checking for Potential Vulnerabilities
Besides configuration-based security assessment of an OPC
UA deployment, we could actively test for susceptibility to
known CVEs and other potential vulnerabilities. To this end,
Metasploit allows to run exploits for specific CVEs against
a server. Furthermore, some OPC UA servers (especially
with anonymous access) are prone to a denial-of-service, i.e.,
attackers can exhaust the number of allowed active sessions.
V. OUTLOOK & CONCLUSION
To assist operators of OPC UA deployments in performing
security assessments, we presented a network-based approach
specific to OPC UA and extended the Metasploit Framework
accordingly. We verified our approach using both local test
installations of different OPC UA implementations as well as
public test servers. Currently, we are further extending our
toolset, especially by integrating more vulnerability checks.
In the future, we plan to validate our methods within in-
dustrial deployments and also cover other communication
(e.g., publish/subscribe) and deployment (e.g., global discov-
ery and proxy servers) paradigms. With our work, we empower
operators of OPC UA deployments to verify the security
configuration of their systems and detect potential weaknesses.
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